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Abstract 
The effect of institutional change on economic outcomes is a growing area 
of interest: academic and otherwise. This paper examines the influence of 
democracy and property rights on foreign direct investment (FDI), using 
data from 54 developing and transitional countries, between 1986 and 
1997. Democracy and property rights are both shown to positively affect 
per capita FDI inflows generally; however, this paper finds regional 
differences in the relationship between institutions and FDI – driven 
largely by regional and country-specific idiosyncrasies – suggesting the 
absence of a consistent relationship between institutions and FDI inflows. 
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1. Introduction 
Ideals of democratic governance and well-defined, well-protected property rights 
carry substantial importance in the realms of foreign policy, international business, and 
most recently, among scholars of economic development.1 Many political, social and 
economic scholars (North 1990, for example) have suggested an important role for 
political and legal institutions in determining economic outcomes; for instance, regarding 
the effect of democratic governance or well-defined and protected property rights on 
economic growth. However, the effects of these institutions on the choices of 
multinational enterprises (MNEs), and ultimately on flows of foreign direct investment 
(FDI), have only recently captured substantial academic interest. Several authors (Jensen 
2003, Li and Resnick 2003 and Jakobsen and de Soysa 2006, for example) have 
suggested that MNEs “reward” or “punish” particular institutional arrangements through 
their FDI decisions. These studies, however, often assume that multinational enterprises’ 
preferences for institutions are homogenous across quite different regional and national 
contexts. 
This paper examines the relationship between two particular institutional features 
– democratic governance and property rights – and foreign direct investment inflows to 
developing countries. While ongoing debate surrounding this relationship has revealed 
significant insight, few scholars have gone beyond examining how institutional forms 
affect FDI decisions in general. Thus, this paper contributes to literature on foreign direct 
investment by examining the relationship between democracy, property rights and FDI 
                                                 
1
 Sen (2000) highlights the importance of political freedoms in the process of development, while Evans 
(2004a), Evans (2004b) and Portes (2006) highlight the challenges of institutional development in the 
developing world, suggesting that the formation and adoption of uniform institutional ‘blueprints,’ can 
conflict with local values, norms, mores and societal roles. They suggest a more deliberative process as a 
method of institutional change. 
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within regional contexts, highlighting the absence of a homogenous relationship between 
institutions and FDI across regions.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section two examines the case of governance, 
property rights and foreign direct investment in China, giving both context and 
motivation to this study. Section three provides a review of relevant theoretical and 
empirical literature, paying particular attention to the measurement of institutions and 
determinants of FDI. Section four presents a conceptual model of FDI, democracy and 
property rights. Section five discusses the ideal and actual data used in this study. Section 
six introduces empirical models, and presents the results of these models. Finally, section 
seven concludes and provides directions for further investigation. 
 
2. Governance, Property Rights and FDI in China 
The complexity of relationships between systems of governance, property rights 
protection and the decisions of foreign investors is clear from the case of China. This 
brief case study does not seek to thoroughly analyze property rights, governance and 
foreign investment in China. Instead, it introduces deeper complexity surrounding issues 
of property rights and governance; thereby motivating and placing this study in a broader 
discussion. 
In a Newsweek article, Schafer (2007) notes that China, the burgeoning economy 
far outpaces the process of legal reform, suggesting: 
Though education levels are rising, for example, many judges, lawyers 
and prosecutors remain poorly trained. Cases are still often decided by 
bribes and political connections. And the [Communist] party shows no 
sign of ceding its control – almost all judges are party members and 
required to obey its orders (Schafer 2007).  
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The legal mechanisms through which citizens and firms can claim their rights are 
ineffective and remain under government supervision. However, Schafer suggests that in 
spite of its rudimentary court systems, China has seen booming economic growth and 
massive quantities of foreign investment. As she explains, “The secret: entrepreneurs 
have found a variety of creative solutions to get around China's unreliable courts. These 
include seeking mediation for business disputes from sympathetic party officials, 
enforcing contracts by threatening to go elsewhere, and protecting trade secrets with 
heightened security” (Schafer 2007). Where formal legal systems leave a gap, informal 
mechanisms have come to carry greater importance. However, without clearly delineated 
rights to property, one might question how far one of the world’s fastest-growing 
economies can go before the absence of formal institutions becomes a heavy burden. 
With regard to social and political rights, Chinese citizens often fall victim to the 
loss of rights to property for the sake of state-led development. One recent high-profile 
story involves a couple who struggled to protect their house, located on the site of a 
government-backed development project, from demolition. A Los Angeles Times article 
quotes a Chinese sociology professor, saying that “they should leave this house standing 
as a monument to the Chinese people's struggle for property rights” (LA Times 2007a). 
Economic activity, too, suffers from a lack of well-defined property rights. A 
report from Intellectual Property Rights Today suggests that “while many U.S. 
companies have been successful in China, foreign businesses tend to underestimate the 
challenges encountered when doing business in China” (Bates 2006). Particularly, the 
report notes that an erratic and unpredictable business environment; mercantilist, state 
controlled and export-oriented economic policy; and differences in cultural views of 
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intellectual property present challenges to foreign firms operating in China (Bates 2006). 
While business appears to flourish in China, many suggest that the absence of well-
defined, well-enforced property rights constitutes a distinct challenge to foreign firms. 
However, some changes are occurring in China’s legal system, notably the recent 
adoption of a comprehensive Property Law.  
The National People’s Congress of China, the body that formally makes the 
decisions mandated by the Chinese Communist Party, has recently recognized the 
precarious Chinese property rights situation; pushing a hotly debated property rights 
policy into law. The law (adopted on March 16, 2007) aims to “maintain the basic 
economic system of the country, maintain the order of market economy under socialism, 
ascertain the ownership of property, apply the effect of property and protect the rights of 
the property owner” by allowing for the registration of land use rights (the Chinese 
government still owns all land), registration of immovable property (such as houses and 
other structures), and providing new mechanisms for the enforcement of such rights 
(Mondaq Business Briefing 2007). One business news service explains that “although the 
new Property Law is not expected to directly impact foreign business in or involved with 
China, these laws institutionalizing private property ownership rights are expected to 
eventually bring large scale changes to China that will necessarily affect all businesses 
there” (Mondaq Business Briefing 2007). 
The relationship between property rights, governance and the activities of foreign 
firms in China is enormously complex and rapidly changing. While the Communist Party 
retains control of government decision-making processes, the party has recently passed 
important property rights legislation. However, there are deep paradoxes between 
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Communist control and private property rights, requiring a critical look at how property 
rights systems are conceived and enforced in a Communist regime. Referring to the 
couple famous for defending their home from demolition, one Chinese blogger writes (as 
cited by a Los Angeles Times article), “if they forcibly tear down the house then the new 
Chinese property law is nothing but a blank piece of paper” (LA Times 2007b). Property 
rights and governance structures, it seems, are complex institutions. This paper aims to 
remain mindful of this complexity when empirically examining theses institutions. 
 
3. A Review of Theoretical and Empirical Literature 
3.1  Theoretic Background 
Theoretical explanations of foreign direct investment, according to Agarwal 
(1980) fall into four overlapping categories: i) assuming the perfection of national factor 
and product markets (e.g. rates of return and risk of FDI), ii) considering market 
imperfections (e.g. information uncertainty, commitment problems and imperfect market 
structures), iii) addressing firm-specific reasons for investment (e.g. internalization 
advantages), and finally iv) considering host country conditions for FDI (e.g. political 
instability, labor costs and incentives for FDI). In the spirit of this last category, 
Schneider and Frey (1985) consider host country economic and political determinants of 
FDI. Potential sources of profitable foreign investment include the size of the local 
market, the level of and continued potential for economic growth, and workforce skill. 
Potential risks include balance of payments deficits, inflation rates, multilateral 
development aid and political instability. 
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An important advance in FDI theory is Dunning’s (1988, 1993, 2001) eclectic 
paradigm of international production, originally proposed as a new way of explaining 
both the initial decision of firms to participate in foreign direct investment, as well as the 
subsequent growth of FDI. In this framework, the structure and intensity of a 
multinational enterprise’s (MNE’s) foreign direct investment depend on three specific 
considerations: ownership-specific advantages, internalization advantages, and location-
specific advantages. Ownership-specific advantages come largely in the form of firm-
specific intangible and intellectual assets, as well as common governance of productive 
activities across national boundaries. Ownership-specific advantages are integral to the 
capacity of a firm to increase value added by productive activities. Internalization 
advantages reflect greater organizational efficiencies and hierarchies, as well as a firm’s 
ability to exercise monopoly power, due to control and ownership over productive assets. 
By exploiting internal economies and efficiencies, and by gaining monopolistic power 
within local economies, firms can further enhance the profitability of their foreign 
productive activities. Finally, location-specific advantages include resource endowments, 
market size, quality, price and productivity of inputs, as well as country-specific political, 
social and institutional environments that enable a firm’s ownership-specific and 
internalization advantages. 
Dunning (2001) suggests a strong role for institutional considerations in his 
framework, noting that “depending on the extent to which the country is able to create a 
satisfactory legal system, commercial infrastructure and business culture,” the location-
specific advantages will increase, and inward foreign direct investment to a country will 
grow (Dunning 2001, p. 181). Li and Resnick (2003) expand on this, noting that “host 
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government policies create location-specific conditions that affect how well a firm can 
exploit its advantages” (Li and Resnick 2003, p. 180).  
With regard to democracy and property rights specifically, Li and Resnick (2003) 
argue that democratic governance contributes positively to FDI inflows through its 
contribution to the provision and protection of property rights across time; a claim 
substantiated by Olson (1993) and McGuire and Olson (1996). Outside of its contribution 
to property rights, however, Li and Resnick argue that democratic governance hinders 
FDI inflows through three potential mechanisms. First, democratic governance limits the 
ability of MNEs to exploit a monopolistic or oligopolistic position, in effect placing the 
public interest above the interest of MNEs. Second, democratic governance affects host 
country industrial policy so as to protect indigenous firms from multinational 
competitors, again by placing domestic concerns above MNE interests. Third, democracy 
impacts the fiscal and financial incentives offered to foreign capital.  
In a more recent paper, Jakobsen and de Soysa (2006) suggest that in addition to 
protecting property rights, democratization is related to open cross-border trade and high 
levels of workforce education – conditions that are expected to attract more FDI. Further, 
they argue that MNEs might seek democratic countries for their well-established 
competitive markets, rather than simply to secure monopolistic positions. Finally, 
Jakobsen and de Soysa argue that democracies, in representing their own national 
interest, may seek the investment of MNEs as a tool for economic development, instead 
of protecting rent-seeking domestic firms.  
Theoretic literature reviewed here places consideration of political and legal 
institutions within the context of multinational enterprises’ decision-making process. 
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Democracy is seen to enable firm-specific advantages by providing and protecting 
property rights. Outside of its contribution to property rights, the effect of democratic 
governance on FDI flows is hotly contested. However, each side of this debate assumes a 
consistently applicable relationship between institutional features and property rights. 
While political and legal institutions are undoubtedly important to FDI decisions, the 
consistency of their effects on FDI flows to vastly different regions and nations may not 
be as obvious as some authors purport.  
3.2  Empirical Literature 
This section outlines previous empirical research focused on the measurement of 
institutions (specifically property rights and democracy), as well as the effect of these 
institutions on economic outcomes. This section continues with a discussion of literature 
that has empirically examined the determinants of foreign direct investment.  
A number of recent empirical studies have examined the effect of institutional 
characteristics on economic outcomes, with particular attention given to the measurement 
of institutions.2 Barro (1994) examines the effect of democracy on economic growth, 
measuring democracy using the Gastil Index of political rights.3 He controls for rule of 
law using a measure developed by the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), a 
political risk consulting service, and accounts for other variables typical in explaining 
growth, and finds that apart from contributing to growth through greater rule of law, free 
                                                 
2
  Important advances in understanding and measuring the relationship between institutional characteristics 
and economic outcomes have been made by Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001 and 2004), who 
proxy institutional characteristics using 1500s and 1900s urbanization and colonization data. Though these 
studies present a fascinating approach to measuring institutional characteristics, their relevance to the 
current paper does not merit detailed attention.  
3
 The Gastil Index was developed by the Freedom House. The index captures political rights along a single 
continuum from 1 to 7. However, the index does not measure various components of institutionalized 
democracy and the structure of governance. Using this index as a measure of democracy thus places 
political rights as the sole characteristic of democracy. 
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markets, small government consumption and high human capital, democracy is weakly 
and negatively related to GDP growth. Leblang (1996) examines the impact of both 
democracy and property rights on economic growth, measuring democracy using the 
Polity II dataset4 and property rights using two proxy variables; exchange controls and 
total credit allocated to private sector investment as a percentage of GDP.  He finds that 
while property rights contribute significantly to economic growth, democracy has no 
significant effect on growth outside of its contribution to the security of property rights.  
Knack and Keefer (1995 and 1997) evaluate the effect of property rights 
institutions on economic growth, using two new measures of property rights. One 
measure of property rights is based on data from a business risk consulting firm called 
Business Environmental Risk Intelligence (BERI). This index of property rights is 
constructed by aggregating four components: contract enforceability, infrastructure 
quality, nationalization potential and bureaucratic delays. A second measure of property 
rights is based on data from a similar firm, International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). 
Similarly, the index is constructed by aggregating five components: expropriation risk, 
rule of law, repudiation of contracts by government, corruption in government and 
quality of bureaucracy. Knack and Keefer find evidence that using both measures, 
property rights strongly influence rates of economic growth and the convergence in per 
capita income between high and low-income countries. 
Empirical literature examining the determinants of FDI inflows tends to neglect 
treatment of democratic governance and property rights, instead often seeking to capture 
                                                 
4
 Polity II, and the more recent Polity III and Polity IV datasets, measures democracy as an index ranging 
from -10 (autocracy) to +10 (democracy). This index is constructed by aggregating five components: 
political competition, competitiveness of executive recruitment, openness of executive recruitment, and 
existence of constraints on the executive branch of government. 
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some element of political and social instability as a determinant of investment risk. For 
example, Schneider and Frey (1985) examine the determinants of variations in per-capita 
FDI inflows across 80 developing countries, finding market size (measured as GDP), 
balance of payments deficit, bilateral aid (from both western and communist countries) 
and political instability to be significant determinants of foreign direct investment. 
Similarly, Jun and Singh (1996) find that across a panel of developing countries, political 
risk and business operating conditions (measured using BERI data on business operating 
risk), as well as market size, economic growth, time effects and export orientation, 
significantly determine variations in FDI inflows as a share of GDP, across a panel of 
developing countries.  
Several recent papers have given specific empirical attention to the role of 
democratic governance and property rights in foreign direct investment. Jensen (2003) 
examines the effect of democracy (measured using Polity III data) on the ratio of FDI to 
GDP across a panel of countries, finding that using ordinary least squares estimates, 
democracy positively affects FDI inflows. Li and Resnick (2003) examine the effect of 
both democracy (measured using Polity IV data) and property rights (measured using a 
property rights index developed by Knack and Keefer, based on data from ICRG) on total 
FDI inflows across countries and time. Li and Resnick find evidence that controlling for 
market size, regime durability, economic growth, exchange rate volatility and other 
economic determinants, and estimating the relationship with a correction for first-order 
serial correlation, democracy negatively affects FDI inflows, while property rights 
protection positively affects FDI inflows. 
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Finally, Jakobsen and de Soysa (2006) suggest bias in Li and Resnick’s estimates, 
due to the use of an untransformed and highly skewed measure of FDI, as well as the 
unaccounted-for inclusion of China in the sample. Once these errors are corrected, 
democracy (measured using both Polity IV data and the Freedom House index of political 
and civil rights) and property rights (measured using an index based on ICRG data) both 
increase flows of FDI, using a similar estimation method as Li and Resnick. 
Recent empirical literature has developed a variety of techniques to measure both 
democracy and property rights, and in addition, several studies have examined the effect 
of institutional variables on FDI inflows, finding that while property rights generally 
increase FDI inflows, the empirical relationship between democracy and FDI is complex 
and uncertain. However, the literature presented here has examined the relationship 
between institutions and FDI in general, across all countries, potentially obscuring 
differences between particular regions and countries. Appendix one presents a summary 
of the empirical literature presented here, measurements used, and relevant findings.  
  
 
4. A Conceptual Model of Democracy, Property Rights and FDI  
As described above, Dunning’s conceptual framework for understanding 
international production rests on three sources of advantages for the multinational 
enterprise (MNE); ownership-specific, internalization, and location-specific advantages. 
When considering determinants of FDI inflows to developing countries, it is important to 
note how the location-specific advantages of particular countries – particularly their 
economic, political, legal and social environments – facilitate and enable firms’ 
 12 
ownership-specific and internalization advantages (see Dunning 2001; Jensen 2003; Li 
and Resnick 2003; Jakobsen and de Soysa 2006). 
North (1990) defines property rights as “the rights individuals appropriate over 
their own labor and the goods and services they possess. Appropriation is a function of 
legal rules, organizational forms, enforcement, and norms of behavior – that is, the 
institutional framework” (North 1990, p. 33). Property rights are expected to increase 
FDI inflows by effectively allowing firms security of ownership and use of their physical 
and intangible assets, by ensuring effective registration and enforcement mechanisms, 
and finally, by protecting a firm’s assets from government expropriation. Given the 
complexity of property rights institutions, qualitatively ‘good’ property rights may take a 
wide variety of forms. For instance, one country may provide legal and political 
protection of property rights for foreign investors, while another may allow only citizens 
to hold formal titles to land. While ‘better’ property rights are thought to support 
economic activity, ‘good’ property rights may support the economic function of one 
group at the exclusion of another (e.g. rights for MNEs and not citizens, or vice versa).  
The concept of democracy has been the subject of countless political debates and 
philosophical inquiries. Most simply, democracy implies the rule of the people, by direct 
(consensus-based) or indirect (representative-based) means. In addition to a specific 
institutional structure, democracy also implies a particular set of rights and freedoms of 
citizens, allowing for both institutional expression and legal protection of the public 
interest. In this regard, democracy is often though to be the only form of political 
organization capable of providing and protecting individual rights to property in the long 
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run (Olson 1993; McGuire and Olson 1996). Thus, democracy is potentially supportive of 
the activities of MNEs, thereby attracting greater FDI inflows.  
However, recent theoretic and empirical literature (again, Jensen 2003; Li and 
Resnick 2003; Jakobsen and de Soysa 2006) suggests that outside of its contribution to 
property rights, democracy has a notably ambiguous effect on FDI inflows. Democratic 
governance potentially restrains monopoly-seeking MNEs and reduces domestic 
incentives made available to foreign capital, in efforts to protect the rights and interests of 
domestic firms and citizens. Democratic governance might also provide higher 
investments in human capital and openness to international trade, and in addition, might 
pursue FDI as a tool for economic development, similarly motivated by the rights and 
interests of domestic citizens and firms. In all, different democratic countries may 
actively constrain or seek FDI inflows for different reasons. 
Finally, democracy and property rights likely symbolize institutional credibility to 
MNEs. In this sense, multinationals may select democratic and property rights-protecting 
institutions because they perceive these institutions to be credible, legitimate havens for 
their capital. Democracies potentially gain their credibility by providing political stability 
and consistency, whereas the stability of autocratic governments often depends on the 
character of the ruling elite. Property rights, similarly, can gain their legitimacy by 
providing stable and consistent formal legal definition and protection of property, thereby 
structuring and ordering repeated economic interactions.  
In order to reduce this theoretic framework to testable hypotheses, this conceptual 
model must introduce several important control variables, typical in FDI studies. These 
include the size of the domestic market, openness to trade, economic stability and 
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political stability; all expected to positively affect FDI inflows. From the discussion 
above, the expected effect of democracy on FDI inflows is ambiguous, while the 
expected effect of property rights on FDI inflows is generally positive. Further, this 
relationship is likely to differ by region, due to regional and national particularities and 
idiosyncrasies; regarding both the nature and structure of institutions and regional and 
country-specific FDI situations. To summarize a basic form of this model, in country i, 
year t and region j:  
FDI Inflows it = f(Democracy jit (+ / –), Property Rights jit (+),  
Market Size it (+), Trade Openness it (+), Economic Stability it (+),  
Political Stability it (+), Region j (+ / –)) 
 
5. Data 
5.1  Ideal Data 
Measuring institutional characteristics poses a significant challenge, as 
demonstrated by the variety of measurements used by past authors.5 Ideal measures of 
democracy will reflect the civil and political rights of citizens, their level of political 
engagement, as well the competitiveness and openness of elections, and constraints 
placed upon the government. These concepts are difficult to express numerically, and 
while easily quantifiable data (voter participation rates, for example) would allow for 
more direct interpretation and more tangible results, most fail to capture multiple 
elements of democracy and democratic governance. In this sense, an idea measure of 
democracy would capture a range of important components of democracy’s complex 
institutional structure.  
                                                 
5
 This paper’s ideal measure of democracy is drawn heavily from Barro (1994), Leblang (1996), Jensen 
(2003), Li and Resnick (2003) and Jakobsen and de Soysa (2006), each of which briefly discuss how best 
to measure democratic governance. Measures of property rights rely largely on the work of Knack and 
Keefer (1995 and 1997), as well as discussions in Leblang (1996), Li and Resnick (2003) and Jakobsen and 
de Soysa (2006). 
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Similarly, an ideal measure of property rights will reflect a number of elements; 
enforcement of contracts by the government, the risk of government expropriation of 
property, the quality and efficiency of government bureaucracy, and the general rule of 
law all contribute to the security of rights to property. Again, these concepts are not 
easily quantified and any evaluation thereof may be somewhat subjective. In addition, 
without a substantial history of credible and reliable property rights, a country might 
reflect the characteristics of ‘good’ property rights and fail to gain the confidence of 
investors. In this sense, a measure of property rights might incorporate a temporal 
component, as a more durable property rights system will likely attract significantly more 
investment than a less durable system. 
Foreign direct investment inflows are best measured as all inflows of foreign 
capital that grant control and operating ownership of assets (or liabilities) purchased or 
created in the host country. In other terms, FDI inflows are ideally measured as the net of 
assets and liabilities controlled and owned by foreign bodies, purchased in a given year. 
As for control variables that influence the risk and profitability of foreign direct 
investment, an ideal measure of market size will reflect both the scope and buying power 
of the domestic market. Trade openness is ideally measured by the scope of a nation’s 
international trade, relative to the size of the domestic economy. Economic stability is 
best measured by the capacity of an economy to respond to stresses and shocks, rather 
than simply measuring the stresses and shocks themselves. Maintaining economic 
stability is often dependent on a nation’s central bank, and the resources available to 
respond to economy-wide stresses and shocks. Political stability will ideally be measured 
as the absence of political violence or upheaval, although there is some disagreement as 
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to whether political stability is best represented by broad indices of political risk or 
measures of specific instances of political violence.   
5.2  Actual Data 
This paper examines a panel of 54 developing countries6 from 1986 through 
1997.7 The countries are distributed across Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin America, the 
Middle East and North Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa. Countries used in this study – 
and their regional classifications – are listed in appendix two of this paper.  
Unfortunately, and as indicated by the discussion above, measuring institutional 
arrangements presents serious challenges and limitations. In measuring democracy, this 
paper follows a number of previous authors, and uses the Polity IV polity variable, a 
composite measure of institutionalized democracy and autocracy. This variable ranges 
from -10 (complete autocracy) to +10 (complete democracy), and is constructed by 
aggregating five components: competitiveness of executive recruitment, openness of 
executive recruitment, constraints on the chief executive, regulation of political 
participation, and competitiveness of political participation. Each of these components is 
evaluated systematically and consistently across countries. Although this measure largely 
focuses on the institutional aspect of democracy, and not the rights and responsibilities of 
citizens in democratic societies (something captured by the Gastil Index of political 
rights, at the exclusion of institutional aspects of democracy), this paper assumes that 
                                                 
6
 Countries used in this study are listed in the appendix. For the purposes of this paper, developing 
countries are countries with a maximum GDP per capita of less than $10,000 per capita (in constant 2000 
dollars) in any year in the sample.  
7
 Though the data covers 56 countries from 1986 through 1997, some countries have as few as 8 
observations (years), while others have the full 12. Allowing for some imbalances in this panel allow the 
analysis to incorporate a broader range of countries. If limited to the full series of 12 years for each country, 
the size of the panel drops to 29 countries, significantly reducing the sample size. However, the use of an 
unbalanced panel limits empirical techniques available, such as correction for panel-specific serial 
correlation. Results from balanced-panel GLS regressions, uncorrected and corrected for serial correlation, 
are listed in appendix two of this paper.  
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those rights and responsibilities are embedded in the institutional structure of democracy, 
and Polity IV’s polity measure sufficiently captures a wide range of characteristics of 
democratic nations. Polity IV data were obtained through the Polity IV Project, a research 
project supported by the Center for International Development and Conflict Management 
at the University of Maryland and the Center for Global Policy at George Mason 
University. 
Property rights, following previous studies, are represented using an index of 
property rights developed by Knack and Keefer, based on data from the International 
Country Risk Guide (ICRG). This index is made up of five components, representing 
both the quality of governance and the structure and organization of legal rights to 
property. These include risk of expropriation of property, repudiation of contracts by the 
government, bureaucratic quality, rule of law and corruption in the government. While 
risk of expropriation and repudiation of contracts by the government are measured on a 
scale of 1 to 10, with higher values representing lower risk of expropriation and better 
enforcement of contracts, the other three components are measured on a scale of 0 to 6, 
with higher values representing qualitatively ‘better’ conditions, as above. Following 
previous authors, each of these components is adjusted to a scale of 0 to 10, so that each 
component carries equal weight in the index. The components are then summed, creating 
an index of property rights potentially ranging from 0 to 50, though within the considered 
countries and years, the index ranges from 6.1 to 46.7. As in each of its components, 
higher values indicate ‘better’ property rights.  
While these data capture a general quality of property rights systems, any 
evaluation of property rights systems fails to account for specific features of property 
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rights systems or various informal aspects of property rights. The ICRG indices on which 
this paper’s measure of property rights rely provide a general sense of the quality of 
property rights in each country, while obscuring specific differences in property rights 
systems between countries. For instance, within the data used for this paper, the average 
property rights measure for China and Romania are similar (32.39 in China, 32.15 in 
Romania). However, anecdotal evidence suggests that property rights are enforced for 
most foreign investors in China through both formal and informal means, and many 
Chinese individuals and firms face threats of expropriation and seizure of property 
(Economist 2007). Contrastingly, a real estate firm in Romania explains that foreign 
individuals and companies can own movable assets, but not land in Romania (A1 Real 
Estate 2007). Effectively, these two countries with similar property rights scores have 
very different mechanisms by which property rights are defined and enforced. Data on 
property rights components were obtained through the Political Risk Group website, in 
Knack and Keefer’s IRIS-3 dataset. 
The dependent variable, foreign direct investment, is measured as the natural 
logarithm of net inflows of foreign direct investment (as measured in balance of 
payments data) per capita.8 Data on FDI net inflows and population were obtained 
through the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.  
As for control variables, market size is represented by a scale variable (the natural 
logarithm of GDP in constant 2000 USD) showing economic size and a per-capita 
income variable (the natural logarithm of GDP per capita in constant 2000 USD) showing 
                                                 
8
 Data on foreign direct investment is highly skewed, with few observations of incredibly high FDI inflows 
occupying the upper tail of the distribution. Using a per-capita measure of FDI inflows adjusts for the size 
of a country, and the natural logarithm corrects for some of the skewedness of the distribution, making the 
distribution more normal. Further, using the natural logarithm allows for some coefficients to be interpreted 
as elasticities. See appendix two for a comparison of transformed and untransformed variables. 
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the level of economic development. Trade openness is represented the sum of imports 
and exports as a percentage of GDP. Economic stability is measured as total reserves 
divided by imports. Political stability is measured as an index of civil war risk, which 
ranges from 0 (low stability) to 100 (high stability), based on data from ICRG. Data on 
total GDP, population, total imports, total exports, and total reserves were obtained from 
the World Development Indicators. ICRG data on civil war risk was obtained through a 
World Bank dataset called A New Database on Foreign Direct Investment. 
Basic descriptive statistics for the entire sample and by region, country-specific 
statistics, a list of countries included in the analysis, and correlations between variables 
are included in appendix two of this paper. 
 
6. Econometric Models and Results 
This section presents three empirical models and their results. The first examines 
a linear relationship between institutional variables and FDI across all countries; the 
second considers the possibility of nonlinear relationships between institutional variables 
and FDI; and the third considers possible regional differences in the relationship between 
institutional variables and FDI. Before presenting these models and their results, a 
number of estimation issues must be considered. First, this paper considers a panel of 
countries through time. The effect of institutional variables on FDI inflows might differ 
between cross-sectional variation and within-country variation across time; requiring the 
use of between effects, fixed effects and random effects estimators to capture different   
sources of variation. Second, the panel data used in this paper presents empirical issues of 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation, implying the use of a generalized least squares 
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(GLS) estimator for correction. Correcting for serial correlation does not dramatically 
change coefficient estimates for a limited, balanced-panel sample (see appendix two), and 
in order to capture a wider panel of countries, this paper cautiously considers 
heteroskedasticity-corrected GLS estimations to be sufficient. 
6.1 A Basic Model of FDI, Democracy and Property Rights 
Empirical Model 
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Log(FDI/Cap)it represents the natural logarithm of foreign direct investment net 
inflows per capita in country i and year t. Log(GDP)it is the natural logarithm of GDP in 
country i and year t. Log(GDP/Cap)it is the natural logarithm of GDP per capita in 
country i and year t. TRADEit is imports plus exports as a percentage of GDP in country i 
and year t, RESERVESit is total reserves as a percentage of total imports in country i and 
year t, and CIVIL_WARit is an index indicating the severity of the threat of civil war 
(with higher values indicating higher political stability), in country i and year t. 
DEMOCRACYit is the polity score of country i in year t, and PROPERTY_RIGHTSit is 
the index of property rights protection, as described in the data section above, in country i 
and year t. In this model, uit is a random effects error term, capturing both individual 
country and time effects. 
As suggested by this paper’s conceptual model developed above, the expected 
sign on β6 is ambiguous, while β7 should be positive, as democratic governance appears 
to have conflicting effects on FDI inflows, while property rights are generally supportive 
of FDI inflows. The expected signs of β1, β2, β3, β4 and β5 are positive. 
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Results 
Table 1 presents the results of between effects, fixed effects, random effects, and 
heteroskedasticity-corrected GLS estimators. A Hausman test between random effects 
and fixed effects estimators indicates that the model is best described by the more 
efficient random effects estimator. This is likely because the use of a per-capita and 
natural log transformed dependent variable reduces the amount of variation between 
countries to be explained by a given estimator.  
The results from each estimation technique are generally aligned with theoretical 
predictions. Democracy, controlling for property rights and other control variables, is 
shown to have a positive and statistically significant effect on FDI inflows in all four 
estimations. A 1-unit increase in the polity score (ranging from -10 to 10) causes a 2.3 
percent increase in FDI inflows per capita in the between effects estimation, a 6.3 percent 
increase in per capita FDI inflows in the fixed effects estimation, a 5.5 percent increase in 
per capita FDI inflows per capita in the random effects estimation, and a 1.8 percent 
increase in FDI inflows per capita using the GLS estimator. Similarly, property rights 
have a positive and significant effect on per capita FDI net inflows, in agreement with 
theoretical predictions. A 1-unit increase in the index of property rights (ranging from 6.1 
to 46.7) yields a 2.5 percent increase in per capita FDI inflows in the between effects 
estimation, a 9.2 percent increase using the fixed effects estimator, an 8.4 percent 
increase using the random effects estimation, and a 5.9 percent increase using the GLS 
estimator.  
Control variables generally carry their expected positive signs across the four 
estimations, with the exceptions of negative coefficients on civil war threat and GDP per 
 22 
capita using fixed effects, total GDP using random effects, and reserves as a percentage 
of imports using GLS. Further, the log of GDP per capita and trade as a percentage of 
GDP are highly significant in the between and random effects estimations, as well as 
using GLS. This indicates their importance for determining differences in FDI inflows 
per capita across countries.  
 
Table 1. Dependent Variable: Natural Log of FDI Net Inflows per Capita 
 Coefficients (T-Statistic, Z-Statistic for Random Effects and GLS) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variable Between Effects Fixed Effects Random Effects GLS† 
0.002 0.688 -0.051 0.051 Log of total GDP 
(0.01) (0.86) (0.56) (2.33)* 
0.996 -0.223 0.813 0.866 Log of GDP per 
Capita (5.63)** (0.23) (5.83)** (22.88)** 
1.574 0.821 1.285 1.132 Trade as % of GDP 
(3.04)** (1.71) (3.79)** (11.54)** 
0.260 0.630 0.474 -0.115 Reserves as % of 
Imports (0.57) (1.88) (1.76) (1.84) 
0.003 -0.002 0.001 0.005 Civil War Threat 
(0.34) (0.51) (0.16) (3.25)** 
0.023 0.063 0.055 0.018 Democracy 
(0.92) (4.10)** (4.44)** (3.51)** 
0.025 0.092 0.084 0.059 Property Rights 
(0.74) (6.02)** (6.55)** (10.48)** 
-6.932 -15.851 -5.830 -7.535 Constant 
(3.44)** (1.19) (3.26)** (16.53)** 
Observations 583 583 583 583 
Countries 54 54 54 54 
Years 1986 – 1997° 1986 – 1997° 1986 – 1997° 1986 – 1997° 
R2 Between 0.762 0.264 0.732 - 
R2 Within 0.255 0.296 0.292 - 
R2 Overall 0.587 0.244 0.589 - 
Wald Χ2  
(Prob) - - - 
2488.12 
(0.00)** 
Hausman Specification Test: Χ2 = 9.46 (p = 0.22, cannot reject null hypothesis at 5% level) 
** Indicates statistical significance at 1% level, * Indicates significance at 5% level. 
†
 Iterated GLS estimator with correction for heteroskedastic panel error structure. 
° With some gaps. No fewer than eight year are represented per country, to retain some balance in the panel. 
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6.2 Nonlinear Effects of Democracy and Property Rights on FDI 
Empirical Model 
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Variables are as described above, with the addition of DEMOCRACY2it, the 
squared polity score of country i in year t, and PROPERTY_RIGHTS2it, the squared 
index of property rights, as described in the data section above, in country i and year t. 
As suggested above, the expected signs of β6 and β7 are ambiguous. If β7 is 
positive, there is a possibility of a level of democracy that minimizes per capita FDI 
inflows, and if β7 is negative, there is a possibility of a level of democracy that maximizes 
these inflows. The expected signs of β8 and β9 should indicate that higher property rights 
are associated with higher per capita FDI inflows, but the value of β9 will vary with the 
degree of nonlinearity between property rights and FDI inflows. The expected signs of β1, 
β2, β3, β4 and β5 are positive, as above. 
Results 
Results from between effects, random effects, fixed effects and 
heteroskedasticity-corrected GLS estimators are shown in table 2. A Hausman test 
between fixed effects and random effects estimators indicates that the model is best 
estimated using the more efficient random effects, likely for the reasons posited above. 
Again, results from each of the estimations are generally aligned with theoretical 
predictions. Democracy, controlling for property rights and other control variables, 
carries a positive and significant sign in each estimation, with the exception of the 
between effects model. Democracy squared carries little significance, and changes in sign 
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across estimators. For all countries in the sample countries, the general relationship 
between democracy and FDI inflows is best explained as positive and mostly linear, with 
higher levels of democracy associated with higher per capita FDI inflows. Property rights 
have a positive but insignificant effect on FDI inflows across the four different 
estimators. Further, property rights squared is significant only in the GLS estimation, 
indicating a somewhat nonlinear relationship between property rights and FDI inflows.  
 
Table 2. Dependent Variable: Natural Log of FDI Net Inflows per Capita 
 Coefficients (T-Statistic, Z-Statistic for Random Effects and GLS) 
 (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variable Between Effects Fixed Effects Random Effects GLS† 
0.041 0.772 -0.061 0.047 Log of total GDP 
(0.36) (0.89) (0.66) (2.03)* 
0.976 -0.536 0.817 0.862 Log of GDP per 
Capita (5.38)** (0.49) (5.67)** (22.93)** 
1.670 0.850 1.268 1.078 Trade as % of GDP 
(3.13)** (1.77) (3.71)** (10.34)** 
0.268 0.599 0.463 -0.143 Reserves as % of 
Imports (0.58) (1.79) (1.71) (2.29)* 
0.003 -0.001 0.001 0.005 Civil War Threat 
(0.26) (0.30) (0.24) (3.22)** 
0.017 0.061 0.055 0.021 Democracy 
(0.62) (3.75)** (4.38)** (3.62)** 
0.005 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 Democracy2 
(0.68) (0.26) (0.36) (0.76) 
0.163 0.019 0.033 -0.034 Property Rights 
(1.06) (0.39) (0.69) (1.08) 
-0.003 0.001 0.001 0.002 Property Rights2 
(0.96) (1.52) (1.13) (3.12)** 
-9.559 -14.879 -4.944 -6.150 Constant 
(3.07)** (1.05) (2.53)* (8.93)** 
Observations 583 583 583 583 
Countries 54 54 54 54 
Years 1986 – 1997° 1986 – 1997° 1986 – 1997° 1986 – 1997° 
R2 Between 0.769 0.138 0.728 - 
R2 Within 0.190 0.300 0.295 - 
R2 Overall 0.577 0.149 0.587 - 
Wald Χ2  
(Prob) - - - 
2624.17 
(0.00)** 
Hausman Specification Test: Χ2 = 7.05 (p = 0.53, cannot reject null hypothesis at 5% level) 
** Indicates statistical significance at 1% level, * Indicates significance at 5% level. 
†
 Iterated GLS estimator with correction for heteroskedastic panel error structure. 
° With some gaps. No fewer than eight year are represented per country, to retain some balance in the panel. 
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Like above, the control variables carry their expected signs through all four 
estimations, with the exception of civil war threat and GDP per capita in the fixed effects 
model, total GDP in the random effects model, and reserves as a percentage of imports in 
the GLS model. Again, GDP per capita and trade as a percentage of GDP have highly 
significant coefficients in the between effects, random effects and GLS estimations, 
reaffirming their importance to foreign direct investment inflows across countries. 
Finally, the relationship between FDI inflows, democracy and property rights, 
based on the results of the heteroskedasticity-corrected GLS regression, can be reduced to 
the following equation.9 
Log(FDI/Cap) = 0.0207445*DEMOCRACY – 0.0008271*DEMOCRACY2 – 
0.033548*PROPERTY_RIGHTS + 0.0017514*PROPERTY_RIGHTS2 + 1.93004 
 
Holding property rights constant, and within the limits of the measure of democracy, this 
function reaches its maximum with respect to DEMOCRACY, at the highest 
DEMOCRACY value, 10. Holding democracy constant, and within the limits of the 
property rights measure, the function reaches its maximum with respect to 
PROPERTY_RIGHTS at the highest PROPERTY_RIGHTS value in the sample, 46.7, 
though it reaches a minimum where PROPERTY_RIGHTS equals 9.6.  
Figure 1, shown in appendix one, illustrates this relationship graphically, as a 3-
dimensional plot, a contour plot, and cross-sectional plots at the respective maxima of 
democracy and property rights. In order to keep graphical inferences within the bounds of 
the data used, the plots are limited to the upper and lower bounds of property rights and 
                                                 
9
 The coefficients on DEMOCRACY, DEMOCRACY2, PROPERTY_RIGHTS and 
PROPERTY_RIGHTS2 are multiplied with those variables. The constant is the sum of the estimated 
constant and the coefficients of control variables multiplied by their respective means. In this case: -
6.149941 + (0.0465472*23.51295) + (0.8620634 * 6.923952) + (1.077655 * 0.6275929) + (-0.143006 * 
0.366425) + (0.0054915 * 71.51199) = 0.317007  
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democracy measure for all countries. The graphical representation of this relationship 
clearly shows the primacy of property rights in determining FDI inflows, as well as some 
degree of nonlinearity in the relationship between property rights and FDI. In addition, 
the graphical representation indicates a comparatively weak preference for democratic 
governance by foreign investors. These relationships, however, are highly generalized, 
where the institutional structures and forms of democracies and property rights are 
expected to differ enormously by regional and country-specific context. The third model 
presented by this paper seeks to capture regional heterogeneity in the relationship 
between institutional variables (democracy and property rights) and FDI inflows. 
 
6.3 Regional Differences 
Empirical Model 
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Variables are as described above, with the addition of regional interaction terms 
and dummy variables. REGIONjit*DEMOCRACYit, REGIONjit*DEMOCRACY2it, 
REGIONjit*PROPERTY_RIGHTSit, and REGIONjit*PROPERTY_RIGHTS2it represent 
the interaction between regional dummy variables for each region j: ASIAit, for Asian 
countries; EEUROPEit for Eastern European countries; LATINit for Latin American 
countries; MENAit for Middle Eastern and North African countries; and SSAit for Sub-
Saharan African countries; and the above-defined DEMOCRACYit, DEMOCRACY2it, 
PROPERTY_RIGHTSit, and PROPERTY_RIGHTS2it respectively. Further, dummy 
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variables for each region j are added, with the omission of SSAit. All control variables are 
as defined above, and represent effects as estimated across all countries, in all regions. 
The expected signs of coefficients of regional interactions and dummy variables 
will be ambiguous, and dependent on the specific relationship in each region between 
democracy and FDI inflows, or property rights and FDI inflows. In spite of this 
ambiguity, we expect higher property rights values to generally be associated with higher 
per capita FDI inflows. Again, the expected signs of β1, β2, β3, β4 and β5 are positive. 
Results 
Table 3. Dependent Variable: Natural Log of FDI Net Inflows per Capita 
 GLS† Coefficients (Z-Statistic), by Region 
Variable Asia Eastern 
Europe 
Latin 
America 
Middle East / 
North Africa 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
-0.033 0.270 0.110 0.021 0.030 Democracy 
(3.38)** (11.47)** (5.71)** (1.60) (2.42)* 
0.001 0.014 -0.012 -0.004 -0.015 Democracy2 
(0.37) (3.46)** (5.21)** (1.55) (5.30)** 
-0.001 -0.365 -0.032 0.449 -0.104 Property 
Rights (0.02) (3.68)** (0.66) (4.05)** (1.02) 
0.001 0.006 0.002 -0.008 0.003 Property 
Rights2 (1.33) (4.50)** (2.53)* (3.96)** (1.43) 
Observations 107 39 201 69 167 
Countries 9 4 18 6 17 
Years 1986 – 1997° 
Wald Χ2 
(Prob) 
4543.23 
(0.00)** 
Note: See appendix 3 for complete output. This table presents only those terms interacted with regional dummies 
** Indicates statistical significance at 1% level, * Indicates significance at 5% level. 
†
 Iterated GLS estimator with correction for heteroskedastic panel error structure. 
° With some gaps. No fewer than eight year are represented per country, to retain some balance in the panel. 
 
Table 3 shows results of democracy and property rights variables, from a 
heteroskedasticity-corrected GLS regression, while full results from between effects, 
fixed effects, random effects and GLS estimators are reported in appendix 3. The 
generalized least squares estimates are used as primary results because of the presence of 
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heteroskedasticity in the data.10 Using these estimates, the equations shown below are 
constructed to describe the relationship between democracy, property rights and per 
capita FDI inflows for each region.11 In addition, figures 2 – 6 in appendix four illustrate 
each equation as a 3-dimensional plot, a contour plot, and cross-sectional plots at the 
respective maximums of democracy and property rights for each region. Like above, to 
keep graphical inferences within the bounds of the data used, the graphs are limited by 
the upper and lower bounds of property rights and democracy in each region.  
Asian Countries: See Figure 2 
Log(FDI/Cap) = -0.033138*DEMOCRACY + 0 .0008975*DEMOCRACY2 – 
0.0010884*PROPERTY_RIGHTS + 0.0011313*PROPERTY_RIGHTS2 + 1.47415 
 
Eastern European Countries: See Figure 3 
Log(FDI/Cap) = 0.2697757*DEMOCRACY + 0.0141067*DEMOCRACY2 –  
0.364558*PROPERTY_RIGHTS + 0.0064499*PROPERTY_RIGHTS2 + 3.41909 
 
Latin American Countries: See Figure 4 
Log(FDI/Cap) = 0.110053*DEMOCRACY – 0.0118336*DEMOCRACY2 –  
0.0317429*PROPERTY_RIGHTS + 0.0021495*PROPERTY_RIGHTS2 + 1.65633 
 
Middle Eastern / North African Countries: See Figure 5 
Log(FDI/Cap) = 0.0206409*DEMOCRACY – 0.0042133*DEMOCRACY2 +  
0.4493084*PROPERTY_RIGHTS – 0.0077105*PROPERTY_RIGHTS2 – 3.85158 
 
Sub-Saharan African Countries: See Figure 6 
Log(FDI/Cap) = 0.0296574*DEMOCRACY – 0.015109*DEMOCRACY2 –   
0.1040271*PROPERTY_RIGHTS + 0.0028695*PROPERTY_RIGHTS2 + 3.44117 
 
In Asian countries, as indicated by table 3 and figure 2 in the appendix, increases 
in democracy (controlling for property rights and other explanatory variables) are 
associated with decreases in per capita FDI inflows. In addition, increases in property 
                                                 
10
 See the appendix for between, fixed and random effects estimations of this same model.  
11
 To construct these equations, as above, the coefficients on DEMOCRACY, DEMOCRACY2, 
PROPERTY_RIGHTS and PROPERTY_RIGHTS2 are multiplied with those variables. The intercept is 
calculated as the sum of the estimated constant, the region-specific dummy variable, and the coefficients of 
control variables multiplied by their respective means. The Mathematica code used to produce these 
functions is shown in the appendix. 
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rights are clearly supportive of per capita FDI inflows. Over the range of the sample, the 
estimated relationship predicts that FDI inflows will be maximized by a polity score of -7 
(the lowest observation among Asian countries) and a property rights score of 40.7 (the 
highest observation among Asian countries). Overall, this relationship suggests that for 
the Asian countries included in this panel, foreign investors hold a preference for 
autocratic polities and well-protected property rights. This relationship is driven largely 
by cross-country differences, rather than within-country effects, as evidenced by the 
complete regression results reported in appendix three. Several relatively undemocratic 
Asian countries (for example China) receive more FDI than expected. In the case of 
China, property rights are enforced for foreign investors through formal and informal 
means, numerous incentives are offered to foreign companies, and the country has a very 
undemocratic political system. Foreign direct investment thus seeks the protection of 
property rights, while effectively “choosing” autocratic polities as host countries for their 
capital.  
In Eastern Europe, both democracy and property rights are positive and 
significant determinants of per capita FDI inflows. The estimated relationship predicts 
that FDI inflows will be maximized by a polity score of 10 (the highest observation 
among Eastern European countries) and a property rights score of 46.7 (again, the highest 
observation in the region). Democracy is a particularly strong indicator of FDI inflows in 
Eastern Europe, driven largely by within-country effects, likely indicating the importance 
to foreign investors of transition from communism to fully institutionalized democracy in 
these countries, some of which are recovering from years of heavy Soviet influence. 
Another distinct explanation for these trends, however, could be the simultaneous 
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transition to democracy and dramatic growth of foreign direct investment from Western 
Europe. In this scenario, the strong effect of institutional variables on FDI is merely a 
coincidence of simultaneous trends, rather than evidence of institutional importance to 
FDI decisions. 
In Latin America, increasing property rights increase per capita FDI inflows, with 
a property rights score of 40.6 (the highest observation among Latin American countries) 
maximizing FDI inflows. Controlling for property rights and other explanatory variables, 
a moderate to high level of democracy (a polity score of 4.7) maximizes per capita FDI 
inflows. Foreign investors to Latin America value property rights, but the most 
democratic Latin American countries (in this sample, Bolivia, Brazil, Costa Rica, 
Ecuador, Uruguay, and Venezuela) may impose substantial constraints on FDI. Further 
driving this finding is Mexico, a major receiver of U.S. FDI because of its proximity to 
the U.S., but also only scoring moderately on the polity measure. Unfortunately, when 
considering FDI inflows independent of source country, there is no way to account for 
distance from sources of FDI. Similarly to Asia and Eastern Europe, the relationship 
between institutional variables and FDI inflows is driven more by regional idiosyncrasies 
than consistent relationships between institutions and FDI. 
In Middle Eastern and North African countries, a moderate level of democracy (a 
polity score of 2.4) and a moderate level of property rights (a property rights score of 
29.1) maximizes foreign direct investment. Thus the relationships between property 
rights and FDI inflows, as well as democracy and FDI inflows, are each shaped like an 
inverted “U,” where extreme values of both measures result in lower levels of FDI 
inflows. This shows a difficulty among countries with the lowest property rights scores 
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(notably early Pakistan), as well as highest property rights scores, (some observations of 
Jordan and Oman) to attract substantial FDI; while countries with moderate property 
rights scores (notable Tunisia and later observations in Pakistan) receive relatively more 
FDI inflows. This could be explained by Tunisia’s relative proximity to Western 
European countries, or by Pakistan’s institutional and economic turnaround. However, 
there may be some room for a deeper investigation into the particulars of Middle Eastern 
and North African political and legal institutions and institutional context. 
Finally, in Sub-Saharan Africa, a moderate level of democracy (a polity score of 
1.0) maximizes foreign direct investment inflows, while higher levels of property rights 
increase per capita FDI, with a property rights score of 36.1 (the highest observation 
among Sub-Saharan African countries) maximizes FDI inflows. This relationship is 
likely driven by notably low per capita FDI inflows to undemocratic countries with poor 
property rights, as well as to some poor, yet more democratic countries (e.g. Mali and 
Madagascar). Perhaps allowing regional variation in economic variable, in addition to 
institutional variables, would correct for some of this relationship. However, also 
important to understanding these results is the role of Nigeria. As discussed below, 
Nigeria shows consistently high residuals through all regressions, likely because of the 
country’s oil wealth and oil-related foreign investment. Nigeria scores low to moderate 
on the polity scale, though it likely attracts more per capita FDI than countries that score 
lower (e.g. Cote d’Ivoire and Guinea-Bissau). 
Some of the clearest observations from this analysis follow. Asian countries with 
greater democracy tend to attract less foreign direct investment than those more 
autocratic countries; foreign investors to Eastern European countries tend to more highly 
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value democracy and the transition to democracy than investors in other regions; in 
Middle Eastern and North African countries property rights and democracy positively 
influence FDI inflows only to an extent; and finally, in Latin America and Sub-Saharan 
Africa, investors prefer only a moderate level of democracy. In all regions, with the 
exception of the Middle East, stronger property rights appear to be more important, and 
more consistently important, than democratic governance. 
One final inference from these results concerns the role of regional particularities 
and idiosyncrasies in driving these distinctly different relationships between regions. In 
Asia, Latin American and Sub-Saharan Africa, for instance, specific countries can be 
identified as important to explaining each region’s particular relationship. In addition, the 
relationship between institutional variables and FDI inflows in Asia appears to rely more 
heavily on cross-country differences, while the relationship in Eastern Europe is more 
dependent on within-country variation across time. These regional idiosyncrasies point to 
the absence of a truly consistent impact of democracy and property rights on FDI, instead 
highlighting the importance of regional and national context in understanding how 
institutional considerations affect FDI inflows. 
6.4 A Comment on Residuals 
In those regressions excluding regional interactions, Bolivia, China, Indonesia, 
and Nigeria consistently produce notably high residuals, indicating that the models 
presented in this paper have underpredicted per capita foreign direct investment flows 
into these countries. For the case of Nigeria, the country is one of the world’s largest oil 
producers, and unexplained FDI may be related to oil production in that country, while 
higher-than-expected FDI flows into Bolivia, China and Indonesia may be related to FDI-
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related policies in these countries, as well as the distance of these countries from sources 
of FDI. In addition, in these regressions, the countries of Bangladesh, Hungary, Jordan 
and Kenya consistently produce low residuals, indicating that per capita FDI inflows 
have been over-predicted for these countries. Reasons for these under-predictions may 
include the geographic location and relatively poor resource endowments of each 
country.  
Futher, in regressions with regional variables, Bolivia, the Philippines, and 
Nigeria have high residuals, indicating underprediction of FDI inflow. This means that 
relative to their respective regions, these countries have been able to attract significantly 
more foreign direct investment, accounting for institutional quality and typical controls. 
Nigeria, as explained above, likely attracts foreign investors because of its natural 
resource endowment, while Bolivia and the Philippines may have specific FDI-related 
policies, or unobserved aspects of their business environment that make them attractive to 
foreign direct investors. Also in this regression, Bangladesh, Jordan, Kenya and Morocco 
have notably low residuals, indicating overprediction of per capita FDI inflows. Relative 
to other Asian countries, including the so-called “Asian Tigers,” Bangladesh has not 
created strong links to international capital, possibly because of the countries relatively 
short history of self-determination. Jordan and Morocco stand out from other Middle 
Eastern and North African countries because of their relative lack of oil wealth, relying 
less on natural resource endowments than some Middle Eastern and North African 
countries. 
In all, it is clear that not all countries have been able to attract significant foreign 
direct investment, given economic and institutional characteristics. Others have attracted 
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more foreign capital than can be explained by basic economic and institutional measures. 
A deeper examination of these cases may reveal deep insight into what determines flows 
of foreign direct investment, and might potentially provide recommendations for 
countries seeking to further embed foreign capital into their economies.  
 
7. Conclusions and Directions for Further Research 
This paper has estimated the effects of democratic governance and property rights 
protection on per capita inflows of foreign direct investment. Using data from 1986 to 
1997, across 54 developing countries spanning Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin America, the 
Middle East / North Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa, this paper has found and presented 
evidence that democratic institutions (outside of their contribution to property rights) and 
property rights protection increase per capita FDI inflows to developing countries. This 
finding is largely consistent with findings of previous literature on the topic. This paper, 
however, has challenged the notion of a homogeneous relationship between institutions 
and FDI inflows. Using regional dummy variables and interaction terms, substantial 
differences are found between regions in how democracy and property rights influence 
FDI inflows. Rather than being driven by over-arching preferences for particular 
institutional features on the part of multinational enterprises, these differences are likely 
due to regional idiosyncrasies; the particularities of institutions, institutional change and 
FDI to specific countries. 
This study recognizes some major limitations. The first, and arguably the most 
important, is the measurement of institutions. Institutions are incredibly complex entities, 
and reducing the elements of democratic governance or property rights protection to a 
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single index problematically places the diverse range of institutional structures on a 
single continuum. For example, democracy in Latin American countries with colonial 
heritage may differ fundamentally from democracy in Eastern European countries 
recovering from heavy Soviet influence. Similarly, strong property rights may mean very 
different things in the Middle East, Latin America, and Sub-Saharan Africa. Differences 
arise because of historical, social and political context, and cannot be adequately captured 
by simplified, albeit broad, measures of institutions. That said, valuable understanding of 
the relationship between general institutional forms and foreign direct investment can be 
determined using these broad indices. It should simply be noted that this generalized 
relationship says little of the particulars of institutions, and more about how general 
institutional forms affect FDI decisions. 
Further research on the relationship between institutions and foreign direct 
investment may take these caveats into account. Measures of institutional characteristics 
might seek to account for the intricate differences between democracies or property rights 
regimes, rather than placing a diverse range of institutions on a single continuum. 
Further, analyses might take a more regional, country-specific, or local focus to examine 
how particular institutional features affect FDI decisions on a country-specific or local 
level, rather than though a highly generalized international analysis. 
Democratic governance, property rights and foreign direct investment are very 
intricately related. This paper shows only a single facet of this complex relationship, 
wherein greater democratic governance and greater protection of property rights 
generally increase foreign direct investment, though this general relationship is found to 
obscure important regional and sub-regional particularities. While institutional and 
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economic phenomena are incredibly complex, by understanding and connecting these 
phenomena, we may find ways to make our societies more prosperous and more 
democratic. 
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Appendix 1: Summary of Empirical Literature 
Article 
(Year Published) 
Dependent 
Variable 
Measures of 
Democracy & 
Property Rights 
Important Findings 
& Notes 
Institutions and Economic Outcomes 
Barro 
(1994) 
Annual 
growth rate 
of per-capita 
GDP 
Democracy: Gastil 
Index of Political 
Freedoms 
Controlling for rule 
of law, human 
capital, democracy 
has a weak negative 
effect 
Leblang 
(1996) 
Annual 
growth rate 
of per-capita 
GDP 
Democracy: Polity II 
Property rights: 
exchange controls and 
credit allocated to 
private sector 
Property rights 
positive; democracy 
only influences 
growth through 
property rights 
Knack and Keefer 
(1995) 
Annual 
growth rate 
of per-capita 
GDP 
Property rights: indices 
based on BERI and 
ICRG 
Property rights 
positive; evidence of 
convergence in 
income 
Knack and Keefer 
(1997) 
Annual 
growth rate 
of per-capita 
GDP 
Property rights: indices 
based on BERI and 
ICRG 
Ability of poor 
countries to ‘catch 
up’ determined 
largely by 
institutions 
Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment 
Schneider and Frey 
(1985) 
FDI net 
inflows per 
capita 
None: only political 
instability 
Market size, 
economic risk,  
political risk 
significant 
Jun and Singh 
(1996) 
FDI net 
inflows (% of 
GDP) 
None: only political risk 
index, work days lost to 
social upheaval, 
operational risk index 
Market size, trade 
openness (and export 
orientation), political 
risk significant 
Foreign Direct Investment, Democratic Governance and Property Rights 
Jensen 
(2003) 
FDI net 
inflows (% of 
GDP) 
Democracy: Polity III 
Property Rights: 
Various components 
from Easterly 
Democracy positive 
and robust across 
various 
specifications 
Li and Resnick 
(2003) 
Total FDI net 
inflows  
Democracy: Polity IV 
Property rights: index 
based on ICRG data 
Democracy negative, 
property rights 
positive;  
Jakobsen and de 
Soysa 
(2006) 
Total FDI net 
inflows 
(logged) 
Democracy: Polity IV 
and Freedom House 
civil and political rights. 
Property rights: index 
based on ICRG data  
Democracy positive 
across measures and 
specifications; 
property rights 
positive 
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Appendix 2: Data Description and Summary Statistics 
 
Countries Used in Analysis and Descriptive Statistics, by Region 
Country Country 
Code 
Mean Polity 
Score 
Mean Property 
Rights Score 
Mean FDI 
per Capita 
Asia 
Bangladesh 2 1.42 16.80 0.14 
China 8 -7.00 32.39 14.72 
India 21 8.25 30.68 0.98 
Indonesia 22 -7.00 25.84 11.22 
Malaysia 28 3.75 34.81 165.38 
Papua New Guinea 38 10.00 31.16 31.69 
Philippines 41 8.00 22.73 14.09 
Sri Lanka 45 5.00 25.09 6.24 
Thailand 47 5.50 35.81 31.67 
Eastern Europe 
Hungary 20 5.82 40.58 170.10 
Poland 42 8.00 40.85 57.39 
Romania 43 5.75 32.15 13.53 
Turkey 51 8.00 30.40 10.27 
Latin America 
Argentina 1 7.18 30.46 104.73 
Bolivia 3 9.00 21.73 28.23 
Brazil 5 7.83 33.73 25.78 
Chile 7 4.92 33.46 133.24 
Colombia 9 8.08 28.13 34.01 
Costa Rica 10 10.00 33.48 66.35 
Dominican Republic 12 6.17 26.05 24.00 
Ecuador 13 8.75 28.73 28.03 
El Salvador 15 6.50 18.06 4.27 
Honduras 19 5.75 21.00 10.19 
Jamaica 23 9.50 29.26 51.59 
Mexico 30 1.00 29.84 62.58 
Panama 37 7.00 22.01 111.26 
Paraguay 39 2.00 24.97 17.89 
Peru 40 4.10 23.02 51.91 
Trinidad and Tobago 49 9.09 31.18 236.04 
Uruguay 53 9.67 29.03 29.73 
Venezuela 54 8.5 30.45 52.76 
Middle East / North Africa 
Egypt 14 -6.00 28.50 14.69 
Jordan 24 -4.55 30.15 15.74 
Morocco 31 -7.50 29.40 8.11 
Oman 35 -9.41 32.20 50.68 
Pakistan 36 5.92 23.86 3.26 
Tunisia 50 -4.42 28.20 27.56 
 Table continued on next page… 
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Continued from previous page… 
Country Country 
Code 
Mean Polity 
Score 
Mean Property 
Rights Score 
Mean FDI 
per Capita 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
Botswana 4 8.00 34.92 51.83 
Burkina Faso 6 -6.11 23.83 0.49 
Cote d'Ivoire 11 -7.36 30.03 8.68 
Gambia 16 2.55 28.93 8.87 
Ghana 17 -3.18 27.56 3.85 
Guinea-Bissau 18 -3.17 15.84 2.08 
Kenya 25 -5.64 28.98 1.01 
Madagascar 26 2.09 22.79 0.94 
Malawi 27 -1.50 26.49 1.45 
Mali 29 1.63 15.73 3.19 
Mozambique 32 -2.42 27.12 1.74 
Niger 33 -3.44 25.73 2.18 
Nigeria 34 -6.08 21.16 10.96 
Senegal 44 -1.00 24.15 5.68 
Tanzania 46 -4.67 29.32 1.85 
Togo 48 -4.78 22.12 3.48 
Uganda 52 -5.13 21.49 3.37 
 
 
 
Countries Used in Analysis 
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Correlations between Variables 
 
Variable 
Ln (FDI / 
Cap) 
Ln 
(GDP) 
Ln (GDP 
/ Cap) Trade 
Reserves 
/ Imports 
Civil 
War Democ. 
Property 
Rights 
Ln  
(FDI / Cap) 1.00        
Ln (GDP) 0.2699 1.00  
 
     
Ln  
(GDP / Cap) 0.6860 0.5161 1.00      
Trade 0.3865 -0.3312 0.1876 1.00  
 
   
Reserves / 
Imports 0.2384 0.2219 0.2916 -0.1085 1.00    
Civil War 0.4067 0.2426 0.3412 0.1612 0.1969 1.00  
 
 
Democ. 
 
0.3817 0.1833 0.4130 0.0796 0.1627 0.1621 1.00  
Property 
Rights 0.5154 0.3631 0.4300 0.1869 0.2629 0.6689 0.2023 1.00 
 
Summary Statistics 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
All Countries 
FDI per Capita 583 34.70197 69.57806 0.0003812 785.7505 
GDP per Capita 583 1796.269 1815.031 123.6133 8000.01 
Log of FDI per Capita 583 2.073936 2.123462 -7.872125 6.666639 
Log of GDP per Capita 583 6.923952 1.141756 4.817158 8.987198 
Trade as % of GDP 583 0.6275929 0.326316 0.1333891 1.945068 
Reserves as % of Imports 583 0.366425 0.310187 -0.0095813 2.775652 
Civil War Threat 583 71.51199 23.86758 0 100 
Democracy 583 2.161235 6.84623 -10 10 
Property Rights 583 27.70774 7.355266 6.111111 46.66667 
Asian Countries 
Democracy 107 3.056075 6.34664 -7 10 
Property Rights 107 28.42056 8.713138 8.888889 40.72222 
Eastern European Countries 
Democracy 39 6.923077 4.009099 -7 10 
Property Rights 39 35.77493 6.848139 23.77778 46.66667 
Latin American Countries 
Democracy 201 6.880597 3.553262 -8 10 
Property Rights 201 27.65202 6.69543 6.111111 40.55556 
Middle Eastern / North African Countries 
Democracy 69 -4.318841 5.537287 -10 8 
Property Rights 69 28.6562 7.106784 17.22222 39.27778 
Sub-Saharan African Countries 
Democracy 167 -2.526946 5.897533 -9 9 
Property Rights 167 25.04225 5.711341 12.22222 36.11111 
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Comparison of Logged and Non-Logged Variables 
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Limited-Sample GLS Regressions Showing Effects of Serial Correlation Correction 
 Coefficients (Z-Statistic) 
Variable 
Full Sample: 
No Correction 
Limited: 
 No Correction 
Limited: Panel-Specific  
AR(1) Correction 
0.051 -0.011 0.095 Log of total GDP 
(2.33)* (0.38) (1.74) 
0.866 0.951 0.995 Log of GDP per 
Capita (22.88)** (21.07)** (10.76)** 
1.132 1.165 1.178 Trade as % of GDP 
(11.54)** (8.56)** (4.93)** 
-0.115 -0.079 -0.300 Reserves as % of 
Imports (1.84) (0.39) (1.46) 
0.005 0.005 0.001 Civil War Threat 
(3.25)** (2.63)** (0.21) 
0.018 0.006 0.011 Democracy 
(3.51)** (0.92) (1.11) 
0.059 0.059 0.061 Property Rights 
(10.48)** (8.21)** (6.19)** 
-7.535 -6.608 -9.210 Constant 
(16.53)** (9.99)** (6.57)** 
Observations 583 324 324 
Countries 54 27 27 
Years 1986 – 1997° 1986 – 1997 1986 – 1997 
Wald Χ2  
(Prob) 
2488.12 
(0.00)** 
1810.28 
(0.00)** 
621.55 
(0.00)** 
Wooldrige Test for Autocorrelation in Panel Data: F = 35.86 (0.00)** 
** Indicates statistical significance at 1% level, * Indicates significance at 5% level. 
° With some gaps. No fewer than eight year are represented per country, to retain some balance in the panel. 
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Appendix 3: Complete Regional Regressions 
Dependent Variable: Natural Log of FDI Net Inflows per Capita 
 Coefficients (T-Statistic, Z-Statistic for Random Effects and GLS) 
 (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Variable Between Effects Fixed Effects Random Effects GLS† 
-0.011 1.952 -0.083 0.017 Log of total GDP 
(0.07) (2.36)* (0.74) (0.45) 
1.057 -1.530 0.832 0.889 Log of GDP per 
Capita (2.62)* (1.43) (3.54)** (12.38)** 
2.048 1.024 1.525 1.270 Trade as % of GDP 
(2.60)* (2.24)* (4.31)** (10.38)** 
0.259 0.543 0.535 0.036 Reserves as % of 
Imports (0.35) (1.77) (2.04)* (0.31) 
-0.006 0.004 0.005 0.004 Civil War Threat 
(0.43) (1.07) (1.33) (2.27)* 
Asian Countries 
-0.094 0.062 -0.022 -0.033 Democracy 
(1.53) (0.84) (0.49) (3.38)** 
0.019 -0.010 0.003 0.001 Democracy2 
(1.15) (0.90) (0.42) (0.37) 
0.700 -0.058 0.067 -0.001 Property Rights 
(1.13) (0.59) (0.81) (0.02) 
-0.011 0.002 0.000 0.001 Property Rights2 
(0.89) (1.21) (0.08) (1.33) 
-12.949 -1.692 -1.967 Dummy 
(1.55) - (0.78) (1.36) 
Eastern European Countries 
0.303 0.274 0.291 0.270 Democracy 
(0.70) (3.89)** (4.44)** (11.47)** 
0.009 0.017 0.017 0.014 Democracy2 
(0.24) (1.37) (1.41) (3.46)** 
-0.390 0.515 0.587 -0.365 Property Rights 
(1.11) (1.95) (2.24)* (3.68)** 
0.007 -0.005 -0.006 0.006 Property Rights2 
(1.17) (1.33) (1.65) (4.50)** 
-15.264 -0.022 Dummy 
- - (3.12)** (0.01) 
Latin American Countries 
0.141 0.056 0.057 0.110 Democracy 
(0.65) (1.69) (1.77) (5.71)** 
-0.018 -0.023 -0.020 -0.012 Democracy2 
(0.71) (3.64)** (3.53)** (5.21)** 
0.019 -0.000 0.015 -0.032 Property Rights 
(0.04) (0.00) (0.20) (0.66) 
0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 Property Rights2 
(0.21) (1.20) (1.26) (2.53)* 
-3.849 -0.241 -1.785 Dummy 
(0.50) - (0.12) (1.22) 
Table continued below… 
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Continued from above… 
Middle-Eastern / North African Countries 
-0.072 0.011 0.038 0.021 Democracy 
(0.22) (0.20) (0.83) (1.60) 
-0.006 0.006 0.003 -0.004 Democracy2 
(0.24) (0.71) (0.38) (1.55) 
2.679 0.637 0.627 0.449 Property Rights 
(0.63) (2.65)** (2.63)** (4.05)** 
-0.053 -0.011 -0.011 -0.008 Property Rights2 
(0.79) (2.76)** (2.69)** (3.96)** 
-33.454 -8.141 -7.293 Dummy 
(0.53) - (2.16)* (3.63)** 
Sub-Saharan African Countries 
0.025 0.020 0.034 0.030 Democracy 
(0.30) (1.08) (2.02)* (2.42)* 
-0.003 -0.011 -0.017 -0.015 Democracy2 
(0.17) (1.88) (3.38)** (5.30)** 
-0.126 0.069 -0.005 -0.104 Property Rights 
(0.27) (0.44) (0.03) (1.02) 
0.002 0.000 0.001 0.003 Property Rights2 
(0.17) (0.01) (0.40) (1.43) 
-3.811 -36.856 -3.588 -4.231 Constant 
(0.60) (2.70)** (1.29) (2.94)** 
Observations 583 583 583 583 
Countries 54 54 54 54 
Years 1986 – 1997° 1986 – 1997° 1986 – 1997° 1986 – 1997° 
R2 Between 0.876 0.003 0.801 - 
R2 Within 0.123 0.456 0.444 - 
R2 Overall 0.529 0.008 0.683 - 
Wald Χ2  
(Prob) - - - 
4543.23 
(0.00)** 
Hausman Specification Test: Χ2 = 22.69 (p = 0.30, cannot reject null hypothesis at 5% level) 
** Indicates statistical significance at 1% level, * Indicates significance at 5% level. 
†
 Iterated GLS estimator with correction for heteroskedastic panel error structure. 
° With some gaps. No fewer than eight year are represented per country, to retain some balance in the panel. 
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          Appendix 4: Figures 
Figure 1. Estimated Relationship between Democracy, Property Rights, and Per Capita FDI Inflows: Across All Countries 
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Figure 2. Estimated Relationship between Democracy, Property Rights, and Per Capita FDI Inflows: Asia 
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Figure 3. Estimated Relationship between Democracy, Property Rights, and Per Capita FDI Inflows: Eastern Europe 
 
 51 
Figure 4. Estimated Relationship between Democracy, Property Rights, and Per Capita FDI Inflows: Latin America 
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Figure 5. Estimated Relationship between Democracy, Property Rights, and Per Capita FDI Inflows: Middle East / North Africa 
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Figure 6. Estimated Relationship between Democracy, Property Rights, and Per Capita FDI Inflows: Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
 Appendix 5: Regression Output, Residual Plots by Country, Hausman Tests 
 
Regression 1 
 
. xtreg lfdicap lgdp lgdpcap trade reserveimp civilwarthreat polity proprights, be 
 
Between regression (regression on group means)  Number of obs      =       583 
Group variable (i): code                        Number of groups   =        54 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.2554                         Obs per group: min =         8 
       between = 0.7615                                        avg =      10.8 
       overall = 0.5868                                        max =        12 
 
                                                F(7,46)            =     20.98 
sd(u_i + avg(e_i.))=  .9230472                  Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     lfdicap |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        lgdp |    .001517   .1046118     0.01   0.988    -.2090556    .2120895 
     lgdpcap |    .996066   .1768606     5.63   0.000      .640064    1.352068 
       trade |   1.573644   .5178024     3.04   0.004     .5313616    2.615926 
  reserveimp |    .259621   .4560118     0.57   0.572    -.6582832    1.177525 
civilwarth~t |   .0033631   .0099342     0.34   0.737    -.0166335    .0233596 
      polity |    .022521    .024495     0.92   0.363    -.0267848    .0718268 
  proprights |   .0246437   .0331961     0.74   0.462    -.0421765    .0914639 
       _cons |  -6.931991   2.017686    -3.44   0.001    -10.99338   -2.870599 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Regression 2 
 
. xtreg lfdicap lgdp lgdpcap trade reserveimp civilwarthreat polity proprights, fe  
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       583 
Group variable (i): code                        Number of groups   =        54 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.2962                         Obs per group: min =         8 
       between = 0.2642                                        avg =      10.8 
       overall = 0.2438                                        max =        12 
 
                                                F(7,522)           =     31.38 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.3546                        Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     lfdicap |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        lgdp |   .6881356    .803271     0.86   0.392    -.8899055    2.266177 
     lgdpcap |  -.2233906     .97101    -0.23   0.818    -2.130958    1.684177 
       trade |   .8214712   .4806997     1.71   0.088    -.1228724    1.765815 
  reserveimp |   .6304706   .3345492     1.88   0.060    -.0267576    1.287699 
civilwarth~t |   -.001989   .0039359    -0.51   0.614    -.0097212    .0057433 
      polity |   .0630994   .0154031     4.10   0.000     .0328397    .0933592 
  proprights |   .0920594   .0152921     6.02   0.000     .0620177     .122101 
       _cons |  -15.85088   13.34901    -1.19   0.236    -42.07527    10.37351 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  1.6289602 
     sigma_e |  1.0685022 
         rho |   .6991741   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(53, 522) =     7.55             Prob > F = 0.0000 
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Regression 3 
 
. xtreg lfdicap lgdp lgdpcap trade reserveimp civilwarthreat polity proprights, re theta  
 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       583 
Group variable (i): code                        Number of groups   =        54 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.2921                         Obs per group: min =         8 
       between = 0.7316                                        avg =      10.8 
       overall = 0.5891                                        max =        12 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(7)       =    355.86 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------- theta -------------------- 
  min      5%       median        95%      max 
0.5988   0.5988     0.6567     0.6633   0.6633 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     lfdicap |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        lgdp |  -.0511247   .0906029    -0.56   0.573    -.2287032    .1264538 
     lgdpcap |   .8129441   .1393501     5.83   0.000     .5398229    1.086065 
       trade |   1.285131   .3391079     3.79   0.000     .6204921    1.949771 
  reserveimp |   .4741082   .2695898     1.76   0.079     -.054278    1.002494 
civilwarth~t |   .0005803   .0035553     0.16   0.870     -.006388    .0075487 
      polity |   .0546416   .0123159     4.44   0.000     .0305028    .0787803 
  proprights |   .0835937    .012767     6.55   0.000     .0585708    .1086166 
       _cons |  -5.829538   1.786135    -3.26   0.001    -9.330298   -2.328778 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  .86254328 
     sigma_e |  1.0685022 
         rho |  .39454295   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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 57 
Regression 4 
. xtgls lfdicap lgdp lgdpcap trade reserveimp civilwarthreat polity proprights, igls p(h) 
 
Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression 
 
Coefficients:  generalized least squares 
Panels:        heteroskedastic 
Correlation:   no autocorrelation 
 
Estimated covariances      =        54          Number of obs      =       583 
Estimated autocorrelations =         0          Number of groups   =        54 
Estimated coefficients     =         8          Obs per group: min =         8 
                                                               avg =   10.7963 
                                                               max =        12 
                                                Wald chi2(7)       =   2488.12 
Log likelihood             = -788.2569          Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     lfdicap |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        lgdp |   .0508611   .0217968     2.33   0.020     .0081403     .093582 
     lgdpcap |   .8656996   .0378323    22.88   0.000     .7915496    .9398496 
       trade |   1.132471   .0981602    11.54   0.000     .9400809    1.324862 
  reserveimp |  -.1146567   .0624083    -1.84   0.066    -.2369747    .0076613 
civilwarth~t |     .00546   .0016792     3.25   0.001     .0021689    .0087511 
      polity |   .0181741   .0051719     3.51   0.000     .0080374    .0283107 
  proprights |    .059368    .005667    10.48   0.000     .0482609     .070475 
       _cons |  -7.535045   .4558347   -16.53   0.000    -8.428465   -6.641626 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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 58 
Hausman Test between Regressions 2 & 3 
 
 
. hausman fe re 
 
                 ---- Coefficients ---- 
             |      (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
             |       fe           re         Difference          S.E. 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        lgdp |    .6881356    -.0511247        .7392603         .798145 
     lgdpcap |   -.2233906     .8129441       -1.036335        .9609589 
       trade |    .8214712     1.285131       -.4636601        .3407023 
  reserveimp |    .6304706     .4741082        .1563624        .1981023 
civilwarth~t |    -.001989     .0005803       -.0025693        .0016885 
      polity |    .0630994     .0546416        .0084579        .0092506 
  proprights |    .0920594     .0835937        .0084657        .0084174 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
 
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
 
                  chi2(7) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                          =        9.46 
                Prob>chi2 =      0.2213
 59 
Regression 5 
 
. xtreg lfdicap lgdp lgdpcap trade reserveimp civilwarthreat polity politysq proprights 
proprightssq, be 
 
Between regression (regression on group means)  Number of obs      =       583 
Group variable (i): code                        Number of groups   =        54 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.1901                         Obs per group: min =         8 
       between = 0.7686                                        avg =      10.8 
       overall = 0.5774                                        max =        12 
 
                                                F(9,44)            =     16.24 
sd(u_i + avg(e_i.))=  .9295739                  Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     lfdicap |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        lgdp |   .0406387   .1120827     0.36   0.719    -.1852492    .2665266 
     lgdpcap |   .9758416   .1814438     5.38   0.000     .6101657    1.341518 
       trade |   1.669842   .5332539     3.13   0.003      .595139    2.744544 
  reserveimp |   .2684499   .4593521     0.58   0.562    -.6573133    1.194213 
civilwarth~t |   .0026502   .0100255     0.26   0.793    -.0175549    .0228553 
      polity |   .0168154   .0269762     0.62   0.536    -.0375516    .0711824 
    politysq |   .0047565    .006947     0.68   0.497    -.0092443    .0187573 
  proprights |   .1626171    .152815     1.06   0.293    -.1453613    .4705954 
proprightssq |  -.0026963   .0028082    -0.96   0.342    -.0083559    .0029633 
       _cons |  -9.559419   3.112293    -3.07   0.004    -15.83183   -3.287004 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Regression 6 
 
. xtreg lfdicap lgdp lgdpcap trade reserveimp civilwarthreat polity politysq proprights 
proprightssq, fe  
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       583 
Group variable (i): code                        Number of groups   =        54 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.2995                         Obs per group: min =         8 
       between = 0.1375                                        avg =      10.8 
       overall = 0.1490                                        max =        12 
 
                                                F(9,520)           =     24.70 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.4214                        Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     lfdicap |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        lgdp |   .7720657   .8646696     0.89   0.372    -.9266094    2.470741 
     lgdpcap |  -.5359654   1.087389    -0.49   0.622    -2.672181     1.60025 
       trade |   .8497659   .4808852     1.77   0.078    -.0949507    1.794482 
  reserveimp |   .5987885   .3350149     1.79   0.074    -.0593604    1.256938 
civilwarth~t |  -.0012005   .0039666    -0.30   0.762     -.008993    .0065921 
      polity |    .060662   .0161752     3.75   0.000     .0288852    .0924388 
    politysq |   .0009073    .003445     0.26   0.792    -.0058604    .0076751 
  proprights |   .0193364   .0501136     0.39   0.700    -.0791135    .1177864 
proprightssq |   .0013753   .0009027     1.52   0.128    -.0003981    .0031486 
       _cons |  -14.87912   14.13724    -1.05   0.293    -42.65226    12.89401 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  1.8251181 
     sigma_e |  1.0680358 
         rho |  .74490998   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(53, 520) =     7.59             Prob > F = 0.0000 
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Regression 7 
 
. xtreg lfdicap lgdp lgdpcap trade reserveimp civilwarthreat polity politysq proprights 
proprightssq, re theta  
 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       583 
Group variable (i): code                        Number of groups   =        54 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.2949                         Obs per group: min =         8 
       between = 0.7278                                        avg =      10.8 
       overall = 0.5872                                        max =        12 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(9)       =    355.17 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------- theta -------------------- 
  min      5%       median        95%      max 
0.6017   0.6017     0.6593     0.6658   0.6658 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     lfdicap |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        lgdp |  -.0613093   .0923258    -0.66   0.507    -.2422646     .119646 
     lgdpcap |   .8167862    .144081     5.67   0.000     .5343925     1.09918 
       trade |   1.268297   .3421583     3.71   0.000     .5976792    1.938915 
  reserveimp |   .4630709   .2704683     1.71   0.087    -.0670371     .993179 
civilwarth~t |   .0008682   .0035741     0.24   0.808    -.0061368    .0078733 
      polity |   .0553666   .0126469     4.38   0.000     .0305791    .0801541 
    politysq |  -.0010077   .0028299    -0.36   0.722    -.0065542    .0045388 
  proprights |   .0325619   .0470291     0.69   0.489    -.0596135    .1247372 
proprightssq |   .0009539   .0008451     1.13   0.259    -.0007025    .0026103 
       _cons |   -4.94353   1.954255    -2.53   0.011      -8.7738   -1.113259 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  .86957849 
     sigma_e |  1.0680358 
         rho |   .3986398   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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 62 
Regression 8 
 
. xtgls lfdicap lgdp lgdpcap trade reserveimp civilwarthreat polity politysq proprights 
proprightssq, igls p(h) 
 
Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression 
 
Coefficients:  generalized least squares 
Panels:        heteroskedastic 
Correlation:   no autocorrelation 
 
Estimated covariances      =        54          Number of obs      =       583 
Estimated autocorrelations =         0          Number of groups   =        54 
Estimated coefficients     =        10          Obs per group: min =         8 
                                                               avg =   10.7963 
                                                               max =        12 
                                                Wald chi2(9)       =   2624.17 
Log likelihood             = -785.5369          Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     lfdicap |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        lgdp |   .0465472   .0228873     2.03   0.042     .0016889    .0914055 
     lgdpcap |   .8620634   .0375996    22.93   0.000     .7883696    .9357573 
       trade |   1.077655   .1042234    10.34   0.000     .8733805    1.281929 
  reserveimp |   -.143006   .0623291    -2.29   0.022    -.2651689   -.0208432 
civilwarth~t |   .0054915   .0017049     3.22   0.001     .0021499     .008833 
      polity |   .0207445   .0057375     3.62   0.000     .0094992    .0319897 
    politysq |  -.0008271     .00109    -0.76   0.448    -.0029635    .0013093 
  proprights |   -.033548   .0309626    -1.08   0.279    -.0942336    .0271376 
proprightssq |   .0017514   .0005615     3.12   0.002     .0006508    .0028519 
       _cons |  -6.149941   .6886263    -8.93   0.000    -7.499624   -4.800258 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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 63 
Hausman Test between Regressions 6 & 7 
 
. hausman fe re 
 
Note: the rank of the differenced variance matrix (8) does not equal the number of 
coefficients being tested (9); be sure this is what you expect, or there may be problems 
computing the test. 
        Examine the output of your estimators for anything unexpected and possibly 
consider scaling your variables so that the coefficients are on a similar scale. 
 
                 ---- Coefficients ---- 
             |      (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
             |       fe           re         Difference          S.E. 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        lgdp |    .7720657    -.0613093        .8333749        .8597264 
     lgdpcap |   -.5359654     .8167862       -1.352752        1.077801 
       trade |    .8497659     1.268297       -.4185313        .3379028 
  reserveimp |    .5987885     .4630709        .1357176        .1976914 
civilwarth~t |   -.0012005     .0008682       -.0020687        .0017204 
      polity |     .060662     .0553666        .0052954        .0100843 
    politysq |    .0009073    -.0010077        .0019151        .0019646 
  proprights |    .0193364     .0325619       -.0132254        .0173099 
proprightssq |    .0013753     .0009539        .0004213        .0003172 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
 
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
 
                  chi2(8) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                          =        7.05 
                Prob>chi2 =      0.5316 
 64 
Regression 9 
. xtreg lfdicap lgdp lgdpcap trade reserveimp civilwarthreat pol1 pol2 pol3 pol4 pol5 
polsq1 polsq2 polsq3 polsq4 polsq5 proprights1 proprights2 proprights3 proprights4 
proprights5 proprightssq1 proprightssq2 proprightssq3 proprightssq4 proprightssq5 i1 i2 
i3 i4, be 
 
Between regression (regression on group means)  Number of obs      =       583 
Group variable (i): code                        Number of groups   =        54 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.1233                         Obs per group: min =         8 
       between = 0.8757                                        avg =      10.8 
       overall = 0.5288                                        max =        12 
 
                                                F(28,25)           =      6.29 
sd(u_i + avg(e_i.))=  .9037637                  Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     lfdicap |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        lgdp |   -.011367   .1690915    -0.07   0.947    -.3596174    .3368834 
     lgdpcap |   1.056667   .4031103     2.62   0.015     .2264459    1.886888 
       trade |   2.048059   .7878086     2.60   0.015     .4255369    3.670581 
  reserveimp |   .2591099   .7350535     0.35   0.727    -1.254761    1.772981 
civilwarth~t |  -.0055029   .0128843    -0.43   0.673    -.0320387    .0210328 
        pol1 |  -.0941076   .0616916    -1.53   0.140    -.2211637    .0329486 
        pol2 |   .3027089   .4319164     0.70   0.490    -.5868395    1.192257 
        pol3 |   .1411231   .2162471     0.65   0.520    -.3042463    .5864924 
        pol4 |  -.0722742   .3277089    -0.22   0.827    -.7472033    .6026549 
        pol5 |   .0252146   .0851626     0.30   0.770     -.150181    .2006102 
      polsq1 |   .0192283   .0166605     1.15   0.259    -.0150846    .0535412 
      polsq2 |   .0088631   .0364443     0.24   0.810    -.0661952    .0839215 
      polsq3 |  -.0175876   .0246211    -0.71   0.482    -.0682957    .0331204 
      polsq4 |  -.0058878   .0249663    -0.24   0.815    -.0573068    .0455312 
      polsq5 |  -.0027688   .0161698    -0.17   0.865    -.0360712    .0305336 
 proprights1 |    .699547   .6197111     1.13   0.270    -.5767719    1.975866 
 proprights2 |  -.3902908   .3509123    -1.11   0.277    -1.113008    .3324265 
 proprights3 |   .0186899   .4547494     0.04   0.968     -.917884    .9552638 
 proprights4 |   2.679199   4.273514     0.63   0.536    -6.122268    11.48067 
 proprights5 |  -.1260525   .4618146    -0.27   0.787    -1.077177    .8250724 
propright~q1 |  -.0110713   .0124535    -0.89   0.382    -.0367199    .0145772 
propright~q2 |   .0067201   .0057306     1.17   0.252    -.0050824    .0185225 
propright~q3 |   .0018987   .0090017     0.21   0.835    -.0166405     .020438 
propright~q4 |  -.0526099   .0665009    -0.79   0.436     -.189571    .0843513 
propright~q5 |   .0016118   .0097178     0.17   0.870    -.0184024    .0216261 
          i1 |  -12.94889   8.340296    -1.55   0.133    -30.12605    4.228275 
          i2 |  (dropped) 
          i3 |   -3.84885   7.682016    -0.50   0.621    -19.67026    11.97256 
          i4 |  -33.45367   63.44758    -0.53   0.603    -164.1264    97.21907 
       _cons |  -3.810625   6.363374    -0.60   0.555    -16.91624    9.294989 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Regression 10 
. xtreg lfdicap lgdp lgdpcap trade reserveimp civilwarthreat pol1 pol2 pol3 pol4 pol5 
polsq1 polsq2 polsq3 polsq4 polsq5 proprights1 proprights2 proprights3 proprights4 
proprights5 proprightssq1 proprightssq2 proprightssq3 proprightssq4 proprightssq5 i1 i2 
i3 i4, fe  
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       583 
Group variable (i): code                        Number of groups   =        54 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.4556                         Obs per group: min =         8 
       between = 0.0027                                        avg =      10.8 
       overall = 0.0082                                        max =        12 
 
                                                F(25,504)          =     16.87 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.9368                        Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     lfdicap |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        lgdp |    1.95191   .8276209     2.36   0.019     .3258978    3.577922 
     lgdpcap |  -1.529933    1.06933    -1.43   0.153    -3.630827    .5709603 
       trade |   1.023824   .4579271     2.24   0.026     .1241426    1.923505 
  reserveimp |   .5425049   .3070848     1.77   0.078    -.0608191    1.145829 
civilwarth~t |   .0039445   .0037012     1.07   0.287    -.0033271    .0112162 
        pol1 |   .0619316   .0733371     0.84   0.399    -.0821525    .2060156 
        pol2 |   .2737482   .0703083     3.89   0.000     .1356147    .4118817 
        pol3 |   .0557714   .0329817     1.69   0.091    -.0090271      .12057 
        pol4 |   .0112468   .0570654     0.20   0.844    -.1008685    .1233621 
        pol5 |   .0199486   .0185562     1.08   0.283    -.0165083    .0564056 
      polsq1 |  -.0104229   .0115258    -0.90   0.366    -.0330674    .0122216 
      polsq2 |   .0174825   .0127557     1.37   0.171    -.0075783    .0425433 
      polsq3 |  -.0233727   .0064297    -3.64   0.000     -.036005   -.0107404 
      polsq4 |   .0061244   .0085881     0.71   0.476    -.0107484    .0229972 
      polsq5 |   -.010665   .0056632    -1.88   0.060    -.0217913    .0004613 
 proprights1 |  -.0582693   .0995924    -0.59   0.559    -.2539368    .1373981 
 proprights2 |   .5151821   .2643907     1.95   0.052    -.0042616    1.034626 
 proprights3 |  -.0000357   .0761599    -0.00   1.000    -.1496658    .1495944 
 proprights4 |   .6371626   .2402195     2.65   0.008     .1652077    1.109117 
 proprights5 |   .0692123   .1558948     0.44   0.657    -.2370713     .375496 
propright~q1 |   .0023136   .0019165     1.21   0.228    -.0014516    .0060789 
propright~q2 |  -.0052717    .003976    -1.33   0.185    -.0130832    .0025398 
propright~q3 |   .0018147   .0015162     1.20   0.232    -.0011642    .0047937 
propright~q4 |  -.0114517   .0041429    -2.76   0.006    -.0195912   -.0033123 
propright~q5 |   .0000199   .0031173     0.01   0.995    -.0061046    .0061445 
          i1 |  (dropped) 
          i2 |  (dropped) 
          i3 |  (dropped) 
          i4 |  (dropped) 
       _cons |    -36.856   13.62826    -2.70   0.007    -63.63119   -10.08081 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  5.5822359 
     sigma_e |  .95638013 
         rho |  .97148453   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(53, 504) =     6.38             Prob > F = 0.0000 
-
20
-
10
0
10
Re
sid
u
a
ls
0 20 40 60
Country Code
Regression 10
Residuals vs. Country Codes
 
 66 
 
Regression 11 
. xtreg lfdicap lgdp lgdpcap trade reserveimp civilwarthreat pol1 pol2 pol3 pol4 pol5 
polsq1 polsq2 polsq3 polsq4 polsq5 proprights1 proprights2 proprights3 proprights4 
proprights5 proprightssq1 proprightssq2 proprightssq3 proprightssq4 proprightssq5 i1 i2 
i3 i4, re theta  
 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       583 
Group variable (i): code                        Number of groups   =        54 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.4443                         Obs per group: min =         8 
       between = 0.8010                                        avg =      10.8 
       overall = 0.6827                                        max =        12 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(29)      =    570.66 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------- theta -------------------- 
  min      5%       median        95%      max 
0.6321   0.6321     0.6864     0.6926   0.6926 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     lfdicap |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        lgdp |  -.0833595   .1127924    -0.74   0.460    -.3044285    .1377094 
     lgdpcap |    .832344   .2351467     3.54   0.000     .3714649    1.293223 
       trade |   1.525403   .3543059     4.31   0.000      .830976     2.21983 
  reserveimp |   .5351597   .2629315     2.04   0.042     .0198234    1.050496 
civilwarth~t |   .0045529   .0034179     1.33   0.183    -.0021461    .0112518 
        pol1 |  -.0221321   .0448571    -0.49   0.622    -.1100503    .0657861 
        pol2 |   .2908041   .0655559     4.44   0.000     .1623168    .4192914 
        pol3 |   .0567032   .0320906     1.77   0.077    -.0061933    .1195997 
        pol4 |   .0377494   .0454767     0.83   0.406    -.0513832     .126882 
        pol5 |   .0336747   .0166855     2.02   0.044     .0009717    .0663777 
      polsq1 |   .0033561   .0080804     0.42   0.678    -.0124811    .0191933 
      polsq2 |   .0168606   .0119618     1.41   0.159     -.006584    .0403053 
      polsq3 |  -.0197686   .0055989    -3.53   0.000    -.0307423    -.008795 
      polsq4 |   .0028728   .0075802     0.38   0.705    -.0119842    .0177297 
      polsq5 |  -.0166323    .004923    -3.38   0.001    -.0262813   -.0069833 
 proprights1 |   .0671548   .0830176     0.81   0.419    -.0955568    .2298663 
 proprights2 |   .5867176   .2620413     2.24   0.025     .0731261    1.100309 
 proprights3 |   .0145382   .0739449     0.20   0.844    -.1303912    .1594676 
 proprights4 |   .6265729   .2384697     2.63   0.009      .159181    1.093965 
 proprights5 |  -.0047865   .1432508    -0.03   0.973    -.2855529      .27598 
propright~q1 |   .0001223   .0015767     0.08   0.938     -.002968    .0032125 
propright~q2 |  -.0064591   .0039177    -1.65   0.099    -.0141375    .0012194 
propright~q3 |   .0018376   .0014614     1.26   0.209    -.0010266    .0047019 
propright~q4 |  -.0110617   .0041089    -2.69   0.007    -.0191149   -.0030085 
propright~q5 |   .0011579   .0028787     0.40   0.688    -.0044843       .0068 
          i1 |  -1.692374   2.170007    -0.78   0.435    -5.945509    2.560761 
          i2 |  -15.26391   4.892031    -3.12   0.002    -24.85212   -5.675709 
          i3 |  -.2411357   2.075339    -0.12   0.908    -4.308725    3.826454 
          i4 |  -8.141102   3.763529    -2.16   0.031    -15.51748   -.7647201 
       _cons |  -3.588453   2.780402    -1.29   0.197    -9.037941    1.861035 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  .85453911 
     sigma_e |  .95638013 
         rho |   .4439401   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Regression 12 
. xtgls lfdicap lgdp lgdpcap trade reserveimp civilwarthreat pol1 pol2 pol3 pol4 pol5 
polsq1 polsq2 polsq3 polsq4 polsq5 proprights1 proprights2 proprights3 proprights4 
proprights5 proprightssq1 proprightssq2 proprightssq3 proprightssq4 proprightssq5 i1 i2 
i3 i4, igls p(h) 
 
Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression 
 
Coefficients:  generalized least squares 
Panels:        heteroskedastic 
Correlation:   no autocorrelation 
 
Estimated covariances      =        54          Number of obs      =       583 
Estimated autocorrelations =         0          Number of groups   =        54 
Estimated coefficients     =        30          Obs per group: min =         8 
                                                               avg =   10.7963 
                                                               max =        12 
                                                Wald chi2(29)      =   4543.23 
Log likelihood             = -684.9135          Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     lfdicap |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        lgdp |   .0173349   .0387718     0.45   0.655    -.0586563    .0933262 
     lgdpcap |   .8891059   .0718229    12.38   0.000     .7483356    1.029876 
       trade |   1.270232   .1224306    10.38   0.000     1.030272    1.510191 
  reserveimp |   .0357251   .1139972     0.31   0.754    -.1877053    .2591555 
civilwarth~t |   .0041684   .0018327     2.27   0.023     .0005764    .0077605 
        pol1 |   -.033138   .0097961    -3.38   0.001     -.052338   -.0139381 
        pol2 |   .2697757   .0235206    11.47   0.000     .2236762    .3158753 
        pol3 |    .110053   .0192595     5.71   0.000     .0723052    .1478009 
        pol4 |   .0206409    .012875     1.60   0.109    -.0045936    .0458754 
        pol5 |   .0296574   .0122419     2.42   0.015     .0056638     .053651 
      polsq1 |   .0008975   .0024066     0.37   0.709    -.0038193    .0056143 
      polsq2 |   .0141067   .0040785     3.46   0.001      .006113    .0221005 
      polsq3 |  -.0118336   .0022719    -5.21   0.000    -.0162865   -.0073807 
      polsq4 |  -.0042133   .0027096    -1.55   0.120     -.009524    .0010973 
      polsq5 |   -.015109   .0028493    -5.30   0.000    -.0206935   -.0095244 
 proprights1 |  -.0010884   .0450788    -0.02   0.981    -.0894412    .0872644 
 proprights2 |   -.364558   .0990975    -3.68   0.000    -.5587855   -.1703306 
 proprights3 |  -.0317429   .0481826    -0.66   0.510     -.126179    .0626933 
 proprights4 |   .4493084    .110879     4.05   0.000     .2319896    .6666273 
 proprights5 |  -.1040271   .1022192    -1.02   0.309    -.3043731    .0963189 
propright~q1 |   .0011313   .0008482     1.33   0.182    -.0005311    .0027936 
propright~q2 |   .0064499   .0014346     4.50   0.000     .0036382    .0092617 
propright~q3 |   .0021495   .0008493     2.53   0.011     .0004848    .0038141 
propright~q4 |  -.0077105    .001945    -3.96   0.000    -.0115226   -.0038983 
propright~q5 |   .0028695   .0020004     1.43   0.151    -.0010513    .0067903 
          i1 |  -1.967018   1.443305    -1.36   0.173    -4.795844    .8618077 
          i2 |  -.0220786   2.191658    -0.01   0.992    -4.317649    4.273492 
          i3 |  -1.784838   1.467905    -1.22   0.224     -4.66188    1.092204 
          i4 |  -7.292749   2.007741    -3.63   0.000    -11.22785    -3.35765 
       _cons |  -4.230921   1.437207    -2.94   0.003    -7.047795   -1.414048 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Hausman Test between Regression 10 & 11 
. hausman fe re 
 
Note: the rank of the differenced variance matrix (20) does not equal the number of 
coefficients being tested (25); be sure this is what you expect, or there may be problems 
computing the test. 
        Examine the output of your estimators for anything unexpected and possibly 
consider scaling your variables so that the coefficients are on a similar scale. 
 
                 ---- Coefficients ---- 
             |      (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
             |       fe           re         Difference          S.E. 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        lgdp |     1.95191    -.0833595        2.035269         .819899 
     lgdpcap |   -1.529933      .832344       -2.362277        1.043155 
       trade |    1.023824     1.525403       -.5015791        .2901113 
  reserveimp |    .5425049     .5351597        .0073452        .1586446 
civilwarth~t |    .0039445     .0045529       -.0006083        .0014202 
        pol1 |    .0619316    -.0221321        .0840636        .0580187 
        pol2 |    .2737482     .2908041       -.0170559        .0254102 
        pol3 |    .0557714     .0567032       -.0009317        .0076146 
        pol4 |    .0112468     .0377494       -.0265026        .0344722 
        pol5 |    .0199486     .0336747        -.013726        .0081195 
      polsq1 |   -.0104229     .0033561        -.013779         .008219 
      polsq2 |    .0174825     .0168606        .0006219        .0044297 
      polsq3 |   -.0233727    -.0197686       -.0036041        .0031612 
      polsq4 |    .0061244     .0028728        .0032516        .0040367 
      polsq5 |    -.010665    -.0166323        .0059673        .0027991 
 proprights1 |   -.0582693     .0671548       -.1254241        .0550157 
 proprights2 |    .5151821     .5867176       -.0715355        .0351685 
 proprights3 |   -.0000357     .0145382       -.0145739        .0182341 
 proprights4 |    .6371626     .6265729        .0105897        .0289415 
 proprights5 |    .0692123    -.0047865        .0739988        .0615011 
propright~q1 |    .0023136     .0001223        .0021914        .0010894 
propright~q2 |   -.0052717    -.0064591        .0011874        .0006784 
propright~q3 |    .0018147     .0018376       -.0000229        .0004042 
propright~q4 |   -.0114517    -.0110617         -.00039          .00053 
propright~q5 |    .0000199     .0011579       -.0011379        .0011962 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
 
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
 
                 chi2(20) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                          =       22.69 
                Prob>chi2 =      0.3042 
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite) 
